In his testimony, both he and the interrogators referred to his try into get a second resolution ( see below comment on the November 8 UNSC Resolution 1441).  In drafting the second resolution, he was not seeking diplomatic means but the authorization by the UNSC for the invasion. If he had been concerned with diplomacy and respecting the rule of Law, he would have called upon the UNSC to move from Chapter VII to Chapter VI- the peaceful resolution of disputes, and would have called upon the UNSC to seek an advisory opinion about the legality of using the notion of pre-emptive/preventive war.

Throughout his interrogation, he mentioned the role of the 250, 000 troop at the border of Iraq. First of all in reference to the fact that Hans Blix had reported on March 7 2003, that there was some indication that Saddam Hussein was willing to allow the inspectors in. A report that many felt would justify allowing the inspectors to continue their work.
Second of all, it was quite clear that Bush had indicated that the invasion had to be done in March so this deadline was obviously influencing Blair’s decision.

Also on March 7, the Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohamed ElBaradei's  in his presentation to the U.N Concluded the following:
“At this stage, the following can be stated:
One, there is no indication of resumed nuclear activities in those buildings that were identified through the use of satellite imagery as being reconstructed or newly erected since 1998, nor any indication of nuclear-related prohibited activities at any inspected sites.
Second, there is no indication that Iraq has attempted to import uranium since 1990.

Three, there is no indication that Iraq has attempted to import aluminum tubes for use in centrifuge enrichment. Moreover, even had Iraq pursued such a plan, it would have encountered practical difficulties in manufacturing centrifuge out of the aluminum tubes in question.

Fourth, although we are still reviewing issues related to magnets and magnet-production, there is no indication to date that Iraq imported magnets for use in centrifuge enrichment program.

As I stated above, the IAEA will naturally continue further to scrutinize and investigate all of the above issues.
After three months of intrusive inspections, we have to date found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapon program in Iraq.

We intend to continue our inspection activities, making use of all additional rights granted to us by Resolution 1441 and all additional tools that might be available to us, including reconnaissance platforms and all relevant technologies.�

CONSTANT ANALOGY MADE WITH IRAN
Blair would throughout his interrogation make an analogy with Iran, giving the impression that if he were still in power, he might have made the same decison about invading Iran. He has no remorse for what he did in violating internaional law in 2003.

DISREGARD FOR MARCH 7 2003 REPORT

No matter what the two reports from  Hans Blix and Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohamed ElBaradei's Tony Blair was willing to defy the UNSC and engage in the illegal act of invading Iraq.
He also address the December 12 2009 interview in which he stated that even if there was clear information that there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, he still would have supported the invasion.

The Guardian reported:

The former prime minister made the confession during an interview with Fern Britton, to be broadcast on Sunday on BBC1, in which he said he would still have thought it right to remove Saddam Hussein from power.

‘If you had known then that there were no WMDs, would you still have gone on?" Blair was asked. He replied: "I would still have thought it right to remove him [Saddam Hussein]’.
Significantly, Blair added: ‘I mean obviously you would have had to use and deploy different arguments about the nature of the threat." He continued: "I can't really think we'd be better with him and his two sons in charge, but it's incredibly difficult. That's why I sympathise with the people who were against it [the war] for perfectly good reasons and are against it now, but for me, in the end I had to take the decision.’

He explained it was "the notion of him as a threat to the region" because Saddam Hussein had used chemical weapons against his own people.� (December 12, 2009, the Guardian)
It is quite obvious that Blair and Bush used the pretext of WMD to justify what was referred to later as “regime Change�

BACKGROUND ON RESPONSE TO ATTORNEY GENERAL GOLDSMITS REVERSAL ON THE LEGALITY OF THE ACT OF INVADING IRAQ

The Guardian reported on January 27, 2010  that “Lord Goldsmith, attorney general at the time of the Iraq war, acknowledged today that he changed his advice on the legality of the invasion twice in the five weeks leading up the start of the conflict. He admitted that he was first convinced by American counterparts in February 2003 that military action might possibly be legal without a second UN resolutionâ€�

On November 8, 2002, the UN Security Council passed a resolution on Iraq; in the resolution under article 13 there was a key phrase “Iraq will face serious consequences�:
 
On November 8, 2002, the UN Security Council passed a resolution on Iraq; in the resolution under article 13 there was a key phrase “Iraq will face serious consequences�:

Recalls, in that context, that the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations; (13).

This resolution was passed unanimously but there was an important reservation appended by Russia, China and France – three of the five members, with veto powers,  of the UN Security Council  In the “Joint statement issued by Russia, China and France was their interpretation of UN of the resolution:

"Resolution 1441 (2002) adopted today by the Security Council excludes any automaticity in the use of force. In this regard, we register with satisfaction the declarations of the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom confirming this understanding in their explanations of vote, and assuring that the goal of the resolution is the full implementation of the existing Security Council resolutions on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction disarmament. All Security Council members share this goal.

In case of failure by Iraq to comply with its obligations, the provisions of paragraphs 4, 11 and 12 will apply. Such failure will be reported to the Security Council by the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC or the Director General of the IAEA. It will be then for the Council to take position on the basis of that report.�

This reservation by France, Russia and China indicated that Russia, France and China, in agreeing to UNSC resolution 1441 would not have signed it if “serious consequences� had been interpreted as justifying a military intervention.
Great Britain must have been fully aware of this reservation and that is why it called for another UNSC Resolution that would support the UNSC sanctioning an invasion.

BUT WHAT HAPPENED IN FEBRUARY TO CHANGE GOLDSMITH’ POSITION ON THE LEGALITY OF THE INVASION

At that time, President Bush and Vice President Cheney were stating that the inclusion of the term “serious consequences� was sufficient UN justification for the invasion. This interpretation was widely circulated by the media.
Subsequently, I remember interviewing the Russian Ambassador Sergev Lavrov after his press Conference in March 5 or 6, 2003, and I asked him about his interpretation of “serious Consequences� and he affirmed that his support for the resolution in no way meant that he interpreted the expression “serious consequences� as giving justification to the invasion of Iraq. In fact, he indicated that he was assured when he raised the issue that “serious consequences� did not justify an invasion. He also pointed out that Syria, also a member of the UNSC would also never have supported the resolution if “serious consequences� would have been used to indicate UNSC support for an invasion.

During the same time, Canada also interpreted “serious consequencesâ€� in an ambiguous  document that was being circulated. Canada had taken the position that it would have been involved in the invasion  only if there were  a clear mandate from the UN Security Council. Canada was working on a revised resolution that, while advocating the delay of the invasion for two weeks, would give UN Security Council Support to an invasion.

Unfortunately, the US and the UK went directly to the UNSC, under Chapter VII of the UNSC, rather than under
Chapter VI- the Peaceful resolution of disputes. Under this Chapter there is a section which proposes the seeking of an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice. There was an active international campaign to call upon Iraq to go to the International Court of Justice. [there could not be a campaign to call upon the US because the US does not respect the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice]. Unfortunately as well, the Goldsmith did not  advice the Tony Blair to seek advice from the ICJ.

Starting in November 2002, along with others, we were calling for the invoking the 1951 Uniting for Peace Resolution, which essentially stated: in a situation where the UN Security Council failed to make a decision, the responsibility reverted to the UN General Assembly. Subsequently, the Uniting for Peace Coalition was formed, and called for an emergency session of the UN General Assembly. The campaign spread widely and was receiving so much  support  that the US wrote a threatening letter to all members of the UN General Assembly; a letter in which they indicated their strong opposition to calling an emergency session of the UNGA. [It was the Chilean ambassador that revealed that this letter had been sent]

In March 7 2003, after the presentation of Hans Blix to the United Nations UN Security Council, there was a demonstration, “Women say no to war with posters in 27 different languages, adjacent to the United Nations. While the media from all over the world was lined up for blocks in front of the United Nations, and we went and personally talked to all the media representatives. Only the media from France and Germany came over to interview us. The media from many of the countries were complicit in supporting the war. Many of the members of the media. particularly in the US, supported the US interpretation of “serious consequences� and perpetuated the notion that the UN Security Council was dysfunctional. In fact, while I believe the UN Security Council violates a fundamental principle in the Charter of the United Nations – the sovereignty equality of states- this was one time where the UNSC did function through not sanctioning the US invasion of Iraq.

If there had been an emergency session of the UN General Assembly, there is a strong possibility that over 80% of the member states of the United Nations would have opposed the invasion; this opposition would have sent a strong message to the US, and possibly Goldsmith would have reassessed his assessment of the legality of the invasion.

While I believed that any military intervention into Iraq would have been in violation of the fundamental objective of the Charter of the United Nations- to prevent the scourge of war and to oppose aggression – under international law an invasion is deemed to be legal if supported by the United Nations Security Council.